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THE BUSINESS PLANNER AND THE
COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION
Edwin M. Larkin t
The creature which today is called a "collapsible corporation"
was created as a device to secure capital gains treatment for funds
which otherwise would have been taxed as ordinary income. In an
attempt to change this result, Congress passed what is now Section
341 of the Internal Revenue Code.' As it presently exists, Section
341 presents a crazy-quilt plan of fortifications designed to plug
the once existing tax loophole. This bewildering set of rules has been
much maligned by the commentators. 2 It is not the purpose of this
paper to add to the caustic comments which have already been
rendered concerning Section 341; nor is it the purpose of this paper
to defend that much abused section. Rather, an attempt will be made
to view the statutory scheme as it exists today, to review the cases
which have interpreted that section and to point out what, if any-
thing, remains of the concept of the "collapsible corporation." This
treatment is intended to benefit not only the business planning
attorney faced with a potentially dangerous collapsible situation, but
also the attorney called upon to defend a client whose capital gains
have been disallowed because of a claim of collapsibility.
BACKGROUND
The motion picture industry was the first to make use of the
collapsible corporation scheme. The classic situation is represented
t B.S., 1960, Fordham University; LL.B., 1963, LL.M., 1965, Georgetown Univer-
sity; Member, New York Bar.
1 Originally enacted as § 117(m) of the INT. REV. CODE of 1939, the collapsible
corporation provisions are now found in § 341 of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954. Most
of the cases which have arisen were concerned with § 117(m). Hereinafter, reference
will be made only to § 341. References are to the INT. REV. CODE of 1954 and
regulations promulgated thereunder except where indicated.
2 Judge Wisdom in Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904, 908 (5th Cir. 1961),
gives a list of 30 articles and 3 text writers (BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 299-320 (1959); HERZBERG, SAVING TAXES
THROUGH CAPITAL GAINS 215-219 (1957); and MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
f 22.54-22.58) which treat the problem. Since this decision, many other articles
have appeared, most of which are listed in two of B.N.A.'s Tax Management port-
folios, No. 29, Collapsible Corporations-General Coverage (1963) (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Tax Mgmt. No. 29") and No. 49, Collapsible Corporations-Special
Exceptions (1964) (hereinafter referred to as "Tax Mgmt. No. 49"). One article
not listed is Note: Relief for Collapsible Corporations Under Subsection (e), 51
GEO. L.J. 346 (1963). An annotation appears in 74 A.L.R.2d 672 entitled "Construc-
tion, application, and effect of Internal Revenue Code provision taxing gain derived
from or through 'collapsible corporation.'"
THE BUSINESS PLANNER
by Pat O'Brien,3 where four people organized a corporation to pro-
duce the movie, Secret Command. Two actors invested a total of
$12,500 into the corporation in return for all the stock. The cor-
poration then borrowed $349,000 to finance the cost of production.
Fourteen months later, after the movie was completed and released
for distribution but before the corporation had received any income,"
the stockholders voted to dissolve. The corporation redeemed their
stock and assigned to the two actors the corporate assets (all right;
title and interest in the picture) as well as all corporate debts. At
liquidation, the stockholders valued the assigned movie rights at
$150,000 after the salaries and loans had been paid, and treated the
difference between this figure and their original investment
($137,500) as capital gain. The Commissioner challenged the trans-
actions on several grounds, but the Tax Court discounted each of
these and held that the gains to the shareholders were long-term
capital gains not subject to taxation at ordinary rates.' The court
refused to apply Section 341 inasmuch as all gains were realized
before it became effective.'
The collapsible scheme was also used to advantage in other
situations. For example, a corporation could be formed to develop
an undeveloped asset (e.g., a tract of land or a new patent). Instead
of liquidating the corporation after development, as was done in
O'Brien, the stock would be held at least six months and then sold.
The income could then be taxed at capital gains rates while the
purchaser could operate and eventually liquidate the corporation,
usually at no gain or loss in income because the property was taken
at a stepped-up basis.
Another method utilized was to have the corporation borrow
more money than was needed for the construction of the income-
producing property. Once again, before any income had been
realized, the corporation would be liquidated, or the stock sold, at a
fair market value. The excess of the money borrowed over the cost
of production was distributed to the shareholders as a capital asset.
The difference between the amount of the original investment and
the amount distributed was then taxed to the shareholders as long-
term capital gain.
8 25 T.C. 376 (1955), acquiesced in part, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 4.
4 The reason for acting before income is produced is to prevent the corporation
from realizing any corporate income which would be taxed at corporate rates and
again at ordinary rates when paid out as salaries or'dividends.
5 In so doing, it distinguished O'Brien from Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,
324 U.S. 331 (1945) on the basis that there had been no sale, merely an assignment
of interest upon liquidation.
6 See also Emanuel E. Falk, 36 T.C. 292 (1961).
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Not infrequently, the income producing asset was a tract of
land upon which a housing project was to be built. Often, when the
shareholders were contractors, architects, or real estate dealers, the
above-mentioned devices were supplemented as in the following
example. An FHA mortgage guaranty would be obtained using the
highest cost estimates possible. In actual construction the share-
holders would cut these costs by taking considerably less compen-
sation for their services than provided for in the estimates.
Consequently, the actual cost of construction often would be less
than the ninety per cent FHA guaranty. Following construction,
a disinterested appraiser would consider all the factors affecting the
new development (the completed status of the buildings, the further
development of surrounding land as shopping centers, increased
transportation facilities, and the natural inflation during the period
of construction) and generally could revalue the buildings at an
amount considerably higher than that originally projected during.
the planning stages. Thus, an apartment house project might be
estimated to cost $2,000,000 which would enable an FHA guaranty
of $1,800,000 to be obtained. If costs were cut to $1,650,000, the
unused funds of $150,000 would be available in cash for distribution
to the shareholders at the completion of construction. After being
revalued, the property might honestly be worth as much as
$2,250,000. If sold at this price, the shareholders would have
realized another $450,000 excess.
THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF SECTION 341
Congress was aiming at such activities in 1950 when it passed
the "collapsible corporation" provisions, Section 117(m) of the
1939 Internal Revenue Code. Section 117(m) was later amended
to include inventory-type properties which would increase in value
with time (e.g., whiskey, cheese). The effect of the amendment was
to broaden the scope of the section to include property purchased
as well as property which is manufactured, constructed or produced.
7
Upon being incorporated into the 1954 Code, the section was again
expanded; as Section 341, it included inventory assets and "un-
realized receivables and fees" 8 as the type of assets which would
cause a corporation to be considered collapsible.
Section 341(b)(1) defines a collapsible corporation as one
which is formed, or, if already in existence, is availed of:
1. To manufacture, construct, produce or purchase property;
7 INT. REV. ConE of 1939, cb. 994 § 212, 64 Stat. 934 (1950), as amended,
65 Stat. 502 (1951).
8 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(b) (3) (C).
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2. With a view to,
a. Distributing gains realized by it to its stockholders before
it has realized a substantial part of the taxable income
which could be expected to be derived from the property,
and
b. Having the shareholders realize such gain.
The late Chief Judge Parker in Burge v. Commissioner9 gave
this explanation of the concept:
That the term was used to describe a corporation which is made use
of to give the appearance of a long-term investment to what is in
reality a mere venture or project in manufacture, production or con-
struction of property, with the view of making the gains from the
project taxable, not as ordinary income, as they should be taxed, but as
long-term capital gains. Because the basic type of transaction which
gave rise to the legislation involved the use of temporary corporations
which were dissolved and their proceeds distributed after tax avoidance
had been accomplished, the term "collapsible corporation" was em-
ployed to describe the corporations used for this form of tax
avoidance....
* Section 341 (a) clearly applies only to gains which would nor-
mally be long-term, i.e., held longer than six months. Every method
of receiving a long-term capital gain from a stock distribution is
covered by Section 341,10 except a redemption under Section 302 (a)
which is not considered to be a partial liquidation under Section 346.
It is questionable whether this exception has any practical value to
the shareholder. However the inapplicability of Section 341 to short-
term gains does provide definite assistance, inasmuch as it permits
the shareholder with capital losses to use these against short-term
capital gains realized on the liquidation."
The gain which the shareholders receive from the assets of a
collapsible corporation will be treated as ordinary income where the
gain is from:
1. The sale or exchange of the corporation's stock;
2. A partial or complete liquidation of a collapsible corporation
which will cause the distribution from the liquidation to be
treated as received in payment for the stock; 1 2 or
9 253 F.2d 765, 767 (4th Cir. 1958). See also the jury instructions which defined
"collapsible corporations" given in Wheeler, Kelly & Hagny Invest. Co. v. United
States, 64-1 USTC 9260 (1964), and Morris v. United States, 63-1 USTC U 9282
(1963).
10 See Treas. Reg. § 1.341-1 (1955).
11 See BITTKER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 302 n.5; Tax Mgmt. No. 49 at A-4.
12 See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 331, 346.
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3. A corporate distribution which falls within the thrust of
Section 301(c)(3)(A) because of lack of earnings or
profits.18
Section 341(b)(2) imputes the consequences of having manu-
factured, constructed, produced or purchased the property to the
corporation if it engages in such activity to any extent, or if it holds
property the basis of which is determined by reference to the cost
to the person who originally so treated the property. A transfer
under Section 351 of an asset constructed entirely by a person for
all of the corporate stock would be such a "holding" by a corpora-
tion.'4 In such a Section 351 exchange, the basis of the property in
the hands of the corporation would be determined, according to
Section 362, by the individual's basis. Under the provisions of
Section 1031, a similar rule would be applicable to an exchange of
assets between two corporations.
Not all property owned by the corporation will render it col-
lapsible. While the code clearly includes any property which has
been constructed by the corporation and which is carried on its
books as a capital asset, there are special rules for purchased assets.
Section 341(b)(3) sets forth these special provisions for "Section
341 assets" and includes:
1. Stock in trade or inventory; or
2. Property held for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business; or
3. Unrealized fees or receivables; or
4. Section 1231(b) property, as long as that property has not
been used in connection with the manufacture, construction
or production of stock in trade, inventory, or property pri-
marily for sale in the ordinary course of business.
These assets will be considered Section 341 assets only if they have
been held for less than three years. The three-year limitation applies
to determinations of collapsibility notwithstanding the shorter "six
month" rule generally applied to Section 1231 (property used in
trade or business) assets.
To determine whether the requisite three-year period has run,
the tacking provisions of Section 1223 will be applied, ". . . but no
such period shall be deemed to begin before the completion of the
manufacture, construction, production, or purchase."'" Thus, an
18 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 341(a).
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a)(5) (1955).
15 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 341(b) (3).
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asset purchased by an individual on January 1, 1962, and trans-
ferred to a corporation on July 1, 1964 in return for 100 per cent of
the corporation's stock, in turn held by the corporation until after the
individual sells his stock on January 2, 1965, will not be considered
a Section 341 asset. Care must be taken that the entire process of
manufacture, construction, production or purchase has been com-
pleted before the three-year period commences inasmuch as the
term "construction" has been broadly construed both by the Internal
Revenue Service and the courts.'6
Section 341(b) (3) (C) which deals with unrealized fees and
receivables has been interpreted to mean any rights (contractual or
otherwise) to receive payment for property otherwise considered to
be a Section 341 asset,
... which has been delivered or is to be delivered and rights to pay-
ments for services rendered or to be rendered, to the extent such rights
have not been included in the income of the corporation under the
method of accounting used by it. 17
While Section 341 assets purport to relate only to purchased assets,
there should be no confusion on the point that the "unrealized
receivables and fees" provisions of Section 341(b) (3) will also be
applied to receivables due the corporation from the sale of goods or
performance of services.' 8
A rebuttable presumption of collapsibility will arise under
Section 341(c), if, at the time of the sale, exchange or liquidation,
the fair market value of the corporation's Section 341 assets is more
than half (50%) of the total corporate assets and also more than
120 per cent of the adjusted basis of those same assets. Both con-
ditions must be met. The presumption is clearly rebuttable since the
Regulations deem the result to follow unless shown to the contrary.' 9
Conversely, however, if the corporation's Section 341 assets do not
reach the 50 per cent and 120 per cent levels, no presumptions,
conclusive or rebuttable, will arise in favor of the corporation, i.e.,
that it is not collapsible.2° A crucial element in the application of
the percentages to the total corporate assets is the required exclusion
of cash, stock in other corporations, obligations which are corpor-
ate capital assets, and obligations of any state or of the United
16 See text accompanying notes 104-24 infra; Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(b)(4)
(1955).
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(b)(4) (1955).
18 Tax Mgmt. No. 29 A-16, which would not, however, interpret the provision
to include rental income or patent royalties.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-3(a) (1955).
20 Ibid.
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States as defined in Section 1221(5).21 Because the Section 341(c)
presumption works only in favor of the government, the need for
it has been questioned. As Bittker notes, "Even without the pre-
sumption of Section 341(c), the taxpayer has the burden of over-
coming the presumption of correctness that accompanies the Com-
missioner's action in assessing a deficiency. '2 2 Perhaps the only
practical use of the Section 341 (c) presumption is that it may pro-
vide an objective standard, "... likely to appeal to a Revenue
Agent in conducting the audit of a taxpayer's return. 21
Section 341(d) renders the provisions of Section 341 inappli-
cable to the shareholder, notwithstanding qualifications under the
aforementioned conditions which would render a corporation
collapsible, if:
1. The shareholder did not own, outright or constructively,
more than 5 per cent of the outstanding stock of the corporation
at any time after construction had begun, or after a Section 341
asset had been purchased. Outstanding stock will not be considered
to include treasury stock.2 4 A person will be deemed to be the
owner of stock if he is: A shareholder of a corporation which also
owns stock, a partner of a shareholder of a collapsible corporation,
a beneficiary of a trust or estate which also owns stock, has an
option to acquire stock, or if the stock is owned by any member of
his family including his spouse, his ancestors, his brothers or
sisters2" (both whole and half-blood) and their spouses, and his
lineal descendants and their spouses.26
2. The gain recognized on stock of a collapsible corporation
from property includible under Section 341 does not exceed 70 per
cent of the total gain for any taxable year. This provision is an "all
or nothing" provision. If more than 70 per cent of the gain is
attributable to the Section 341 property, that gain is taxable; if not,
none of the gain is taxable.2 7
21 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 341(c) (2) (A)-(C).
22 BITTKER, supra note 2, at 311, nl. Jack .Saltzman, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
336, 341 (1963): "We feel that the evidence in this case which is sufficient to over-
come the presumption of correctness of the respondent's [Commissioner] determina-
tion [that there was a deficiency] is also sufficient to rebut the presumption created
by section 341(c)." See also DeWind and Anthoine, Collapsible Corporations, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 477, 510 (1956).
23 Tax Mgmt. No. 29 A-39.
24 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-4(b)(3) (1964).
25 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 544(a)(1-3, 5, 6).
26 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(d) (3).
27 See Cohen, Surrey Tarleau, Warren, Tax Treatment of Sales of Business, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 157, 173 (1954); Treas. Reg. 1.341-4(c)(1) (1964). See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.341-4(c) (4) (1964) for an example of an application of the 70 per cent rule.
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3. The gain is realized more than three years after the com-
pletion of the production or purchase of the property. This provi-
sion is one of the most important limitations on Section 341.28 In
effect, this carryover from the 1939 Code extends the time limi-
tations for long-term capital gains, as applicable to collapsible cor-
porations, from the normal six-month period to three years. The
holding period of prior owners of the property may be included in
the three-year period.2 9 This means that any corporation can be
formed with the intention of collapsing it, and, as long as the share-
holder does not transfer his stock or receive his gain until three years
after the construction has been completed or the purchase made,
the other provisions of Section 341 will not apply. A shareholder
who can afford to wait three years after the completion of construc-
tion to realize his gain, will receive long-term capital gain treatment
for his income.
Other provisions limiting the scope of Section 341 are found
in subsection (e). A brief summary of this subsection and its "fear-
fully intricate provisions"" ° is offered, although a complete descrip-
tion of this subsection is beyond the scope of this article. A principal
reason for the enactment of this subsection was to avoid adverse
results created by the then existing sections. The following language
from the Senate Report to subsection (e) is illustrative:
The collapsible-corporation provision of present law . . . both by
their terms and as interpreted, are so broad that in a number of
situations they have exactly the opposite effect from that intended
-instead of preventing the conversion of ordinary income into
capital gain, they may instead convert what would otherwise be cap-
ital gain into ordinary income.3'
Prior to the enactment of subsection (e), a taxpayer avoiding use
of a corporate form might be taxed only at capital gain rates,
while a similar taxpayer making the same transaction through a
corporate entity might be taxed at ordinary income rates because of
the operation of Section 341 (a) through (d). Congress sought to
eliminate this anomalous result by the provisions of subsection (e).
It provides, in substance, that a corporation will not be deemed to
be collapsible if, "the net unrealized appreciation in subsection (e)
28 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(d) (3).
29 Rev. Rul. 57-491, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 232.
30 BITTKER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 314. Since its enactment, Section 341(e) has
been often treated separate from the other portions of Section 341. See, e.g., Note:
Relief for Collapsible Corporations Under Subsection (e), 51 GEo. L.J. 346 (1963).
See generally Tax Mgmt. No. 49.
31 S. Rep. No. 1983, in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4791,
4820 (1958). [Emphasis added.]
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assets . . . does not exceed an amount equal to 15 per cent of the
net worth of the corporation. '8
2
Subsection (e) applies to three distinct types of transaction: A
sale or exchange of stock (§ 341 (e) (1)), a distribution under a total
liquidation (§ 341 (e) (2)) or a partial liquidation under Section 333
(§ 341 (e) (3)). Section 341 (e) (4) gives certain collapsible corpora-
tions the right to elect the benefits of Section 337 provided that fol-
lowing the adoption of the plan of complete liquidation: (a) the net
unrealized appreciation of subsection (e) assets does not exceed
fifteen per cent of the corporation's net worth; (b) substantially
all the corporate assets are sold within twelve months; and (c) no
distribution of property is made for which exhaustion, wear and
tear, obsolescence, amortization or depletion deductions are allow-
able. Exemptions under the first two types of transactions are
granted to. individual shareholders (limited under the first type
to those owning twenty per cent or less of the stock), while those
under Section 341 (e) (3) and (4) are granted to corporations. It is,
of course, necessary to classify and evaluate both the subsection (e)
assets and all assets making up the "net worth" of the corporation in
order to take advantage of the subsection.
Subsection (e) carefully defines "subsection (e) assets"
(§ 341 (e) (5)), "net unrealized appreciation" (§ 341 (e) (6)), "net
worth" (§ 341(e)(7)), "related person" (§ 341 (e)(8)), and
"property used in the trade or business" (§ 341(e) (9)). Unrealized
appreciation of subsection (e) assets may prevent a corporation
from taking advantage of the subsection's provisions and, absent
other available defenses, can cause a transaction to result in ordinary
income to the stockholder. These assets are defined as follows:
1. Corporate property which, if sold by the corporation or
by a holder of twenty per cent of the corporation's outstanding stock,
would produce ordinary income to the seller. If a twenty per cent
holder would not receive capital gains treatment for the gain on the
sale (e.g., as a dealer in such property)," then his existence will
prevent the corporation and its other stockholders from taking ad-
vantage of the subsection (e) provisions.
2. Property used in the trade or business (i.e., a Section
1231(b) asset), provided that the aggregate of unrealized depre-
ciation exceeds the unrealized appreciation on all such property.
82 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(e) (1).
83 However, if the dealer holds these assets solely as an investment, and separately
from the other assets with which he deals, this will not cause the assets to be treated
as subsection (e) assets. Conference Report on Technical Amendments Act of 1958
in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5053, 5059 (1958).
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3. Property used in the trade or business (i.e., a Section
1231(b) asset), provided that such property, if owned by a twenty
per cent holder, would produce ordinary income as the result of a
sale or exchange.
4. Property consisting of a copyright, literary, musical, artistic
or similar asset if it was created, wholly or partially, by the per-
sonal efforts of a holder of more than five per cent of the corpora-
tion's outstanding stock.
In each of the above-mentioned instances, the constructive own-
ership rules of Section 544 apply. A corporation or a twenty per cent
shareholder cannot take advantage of subsection (e) if the sale is to
a "related person." 4 Other corporate assets, although not held
for sale, may come within the thrust of Section 341(e) (5) (A) (i)
and may be classified subsection (e) assets, e.g., stock of a corpora-
tion which is "Section 306 stock," or stock of a corporation which
in turn holds stock in a collapsible corporation to which none of
the Section 341 (d) limitations apply. 5 Finally, Section 341 (e) (11)
specifically provides that failure of a corporation to meet the re-
quirements of subsection (e) is not to be considered in determining
its collapsible status under Section 341 (a) through (d). Subsection
(e) is difficult to interpret, not only because its wording is complex
but also because it has not yet been construed by either a court
decision or revenue ruling.
In August 1964, subsection (f) of Section 341 was enacted.
The Report of the Senate Finance Committee states:
• .. [S]ection 341 (a) shall not apply to a sale of stock of a corpora-
tion if . . . such corporation consents to recognize gain on any future
disposition by it of its "subsection (f) assets" . . . and if the sale
of the stock is made within the six-month period after the consent
is filed.8 6
The new subsection is applicable only to "subsection (f) assets"
which are defined as non-capital assets of the corporation; these
include land, any interest in real property (exclusive of security
interests) and unrealized fees and receivables.87
84 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(e)(1). Related person is defined in Section
341(e) (8).
85 Tax Mgmt. No. 49, at A-5.
36 Section 341(f) has been designated P.L. 88-484. See S. Rep. No. 1241, in
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3081, 3085 (1964). Other treat-
ments of subsection (f) can be found in Hall, The Consenting Collapsible Corpora-
tion, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1365 (1965); New Collapsible Relief Measure Is More
Useful Than Most Men Believe, 22 J. TAXATION 148 (1965).
87 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341 (f) (4) (A). Special rules apply to property which
is under construction, § 341(f)(4)(B), and to improvements made on land,
§ 341(f) (4) (C).
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The general rule of collapsibility in Section 341 (a) (1) will not
apply to a sale of the stock of a corporation holding subsection (f)
assets if that corporation consents-in accord with one of the
procedures to be established in soon-to-be-released regulations-to
the application of subsection (f) (2). The individual shareholder
may sell some of his corporate stock without the collapsibility
dangers, if the corporation consents to having its future distribu-
tions of "341 (f) assets" treated as gain from the sale or exchange
of such assets. 8 If a transfer is made by means of sale, exchange or
involuntary conversion, the gain will be the excess of the amount
realized less the adjusted basis of the subsection (f) asset; gain
from any other type of disposition will be the amount by which
the fair market value of the asset exceeds its adjusted basis. 9
Although the full import of subsection (f) remains to be seen,
some questions have been answered by the terms of the subsection
itself and the accompanying Senate Report. A consent will be
effective for a six-month period commencing on the date of filing,
and will apply to every sale of that corporation's stock made by
any shareholder during the consent period.40 Once a consent has
been filed and a sale of the stock made thereunder, the consent
cannot be revoked until the six-month period has expired. 1 A sub-
sequent determination that the corporation was not a collapsible
corporation will not vitiate the consent; the corporation will con-
tinue to be subject to the special tax treatment of Section 341 (f) (2)
in regard to any future disposition of its "subsection (f) assets. '4 2
While the consent is automatically revoked at the end of the six-
month period unless the corporation files another consent, no limit
has been fixed upon the number of consents which may be filed.
This new section presents no additional considerations for the
determination of collapsibility. The Senate Report clearly states
that a consenting corporation does not automatically become non-
collapsible43 nor does it become collapsible per se. The subsection
applies only to the stockholders who qualify under its provisions.
A special exception to subsection (f) is made for tax-free treat-
ment under Sections 332, 351, 361 and 371(a) of the Code.44 Also,
88 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(f)(2).
89 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(f) (2) (A), (B). "Other types of dispositions"
include distribution of subsection (f) assets as a dividend (S. Rep. No. 1241, supra
note 36, Example 2), or a distribution in a complete or partial liquidation of the cor-
poration (id. at Example 1).
40 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(f)(1).
41 S. Rep. No. 1241, supra note 36, at 3086.
42 Ibid.
43 Id. at 3085.
44 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(f)(3).
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Section 341(f)(6) provides that the subsection will not apply if
the consenting corporation, on the date of the sale; owns more than
five per cent of the outstanding stock of another corporation, which
has not also filed a consent.
The nonrevocation provisions of a Section 341 consent present
problems to the taxpayer who would "wheel and deal" with his cor-
porations. Section 341 (f) (5) contains another limiting provision
which allows a taxpayer to take advantage of subsection (f) with
only one consenting corporation during any five-year period. Thus,
a taxpayer who has sold stock in a consenting corporation during
a consent period may not, within five years from the date of that
sale, take advantage of the provision of Section 341(f)(1) as re-
gards the sale of the shares of stock of any other consenting corpo-
ration. He may, however, within the five-year period, take advantage
of the original consent or of any subsequent consent when he makes
further sales of the stock of the original consenting corporation. 45
CASE LAW
As is indicated by the statutory scheme of Section 341, the
facts of a particular case will largely determine whether the cor-
poration in question will be collapsible. 6 The cases which have
thus far arisen have set forth some important principles of law.
Of more importance, however, is the fact that they have applied the
statutory rules and the regulations to particular fact situations,
thus establishing specific guidelines which can be utilized to inter-
pret a potential fact pattern in the future.
It is apparent from a review of the cases that two opposing
philosophies have emerged in the area of collapsible corporations.
One group of cases invariably looks to the Congressional purpose
of preventing the use of the collapsible device to receive capital
gains. Many statements of this purpose can be found throughout the
various House and Senate Committee reports. This group of cases
appears to concentrate on the issue of the "view"; if the taxpayer
had the prohibited view, the necessary intent, the case will very
nearly be decided at that point. When there are additional issues
in the case, these cases will often fall back on the fact that Con-
gress intended to penalize anyone having just such a view, quote
from the relevant Congressional report, and decide the additional
issue against the taxpayer concluding that Congress could not have
meant to allow any taxpayer to achieve tax avoidance and thus
45 S. Rep. 1241, supra note 36, at 3089.
46 Braunstein v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd., 374 U.S.
65 (1963).
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reach the haven of capital gains treatment. One such case is Sidney
v. Commissioner.41 In that case the taxpayers organized two cor-
porations for the purpose of constructing two housing projects with
FHA secured loans. Construction was completed in 1949. The cost
of construction was less than the amount of the loans; the excess
was distributed to the taxpayers in 1950 and 1951 along with the
current earnings.
The original collapsible provisions were passed in September
of 1950 and made retroactive to January 1, 1950. The taxpayers
argued that they could not have had the view referred to in Section
341 before it had been enacted and, in any event, not before the
earliest date to which it was made effective. They argued further
that Section 341 should not be construed to apply when the view
antedated enactment and that any such application would violate
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Second Circuit
found that the taxpayers had the requisite view, with the following
statement:
The thrust of petitioners' argument is rather that, in the absence
of clear direction by the legislature, courts ought not construe a
statute as attaching new consequences to views held prior to enact-
ment, since if they do, the statute may violate constitutional safe-
guards. These generalities do not avail taxpayers here. For Congress
made it clear beyond peradventure that it intended § 117(m) to apply
to all gains realized after December 31, 1949, and this required that
significance be given to views held prior to September 23, 1950, when
the Revenue Act of 1950 became law. We therefore could not inter-
pret the statute as inapplicable even if we had greater doubts as to
its constitutionality as so interpreted than we do.48
The taxpayers' due process argument was founded upon Unter-
myer v. Anderson49 which held that the gift tax provided in the
Revenue Act of June 2, 1924, could not be constitutionally applied to
a gift made on May 23, 1924. The Second Circuit went to great
pains to minimize the effect of Untermyer, noting the Holmes, Bran-
deis, Stone dissent therein, and further noting that the Supreme
Court had distinguished the case six times and followed it only once.
Ultimately, the court chose to ignore the case, apparently hoping
that it would disappear, and concluded that the taxpayers should
have known at the time they had the view in 1949 that "1950
would probably see a new Revenue Act." 0 Must they also have been
sufficiently clairvoyant to determine that the Act would contain the
complicated, confused Section 117(m) directed at their particular
47 273 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1960).
48 Id. at 931-32. [Emphasis added.]
49 276 U.S. 440 (1928).
50 Sidney v. Commissioner, supra note 47, at 932. [Emphasis added.]
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type corporation? No indeed, says the Second Circuit, for on Janu-
ary 25, 1950, President Truman stated that such a bill might include
provisions for the taxation of gains from collapsible corporations.
Does the Second Circuit mean to imply that all hortatory messages
of Presidents are now sufficient to put the public on notice of what
might happen, thus giving it force of law? Conceivably President
Truman's message and the "general" knowledge that there would
probably be a new revenue act in 1954, might have lent some support
to the Court's decision. However, from the decision of the Tax
Court,5 the fact appears that the transaction for which the tax-
payers were taxed occurred prior to January 25, 1950, the date of
the Presidential message to Congress.
Another entirely different approach to the collapsible corpora-
tion problem has been expressed. The philosophy of these cases is
that the purpose expressed in the Congressional records is not all-
controlling, but is to be used as an aid to interpretation of the
statute. These cases take into consideration what Congress actually
did, i.e., what the final wording of the statutory scheme has finally
achieved,52 as well as what the drafters hoped to do, i.e., the Con-
gressional report statements. The fact that Congress intended to
catch these persons in its collapsible corporation net would not
necessarily mean that they were, in fact, entrapped by its provisions.
Just as, conversely, the provisions succeeded in catching some tax-
payers which Congress had no intention of taxing at all.5" The
following cases have tended toward this view: Jacobson v. Commis-
sioner,54 Commissioner v. Kelley,55 Heft v. Commissioner 5' and
51 Rose Sidney, 30 T.C. 1155 (1958).
52 For an example of a Congressional drafting error, see DeWind and Anthoine,
Collapsible Corporations, 56 COLtrUM. L. REv. 475, 497-8 (1956) ; Axelrad, Collapsible
Corporations and Collapsible Partnerships, So. Cal. 12th Tax Inst. 269, 293-7 (1960).
53 See the discussion concerning subsection (e) and Braunstein litigation, note
31 supra, and note 79 infra, and accompanying texts.
54 281 F.2d 703, 707 (3d Cir. 1960). This case presents the only reversal by an
appellate court in the area of collapsible corporations. In so doing, Judge Hastie
stated: "If the self-serving testimony of the taxpayers stood alone its rejection might
be permissible. But when several other established facts so strongly corroborate their
testimony and nothing significant appears to the contrary, we think it must be
recognized that the taxpayers have established their contention."
55 293 F.2d 904, 911-912, (5th Cir. 1961). ". . . Section 117(m) does not use
the definite article 'the' in referring to 'substantial part.' The statute does not
require that the substantial part be realized ...or that the part unrealized be in-
substantial in relation to the part realized, in order for a corporation to escape
collapsibility. . . .Section 117(m) requires only that 'a substantial part' be realized.
The indefinite article 'a' says in plain language that there may he two or more
substantial parts. . . . There is nothing in the legislative history or in the factual
setting that produced Section 117(m) to indicate that Congress designed the law
to penalize the reasonable use of the corporate form of enterprise."
56 294 F.2d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 1961). "It may well be that shareholders who
liquidate their corporation by a series of distributions may be caught under section
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Levenson v. United States.57 This dichotomy of judicial approach
does not facilitate a uniform and certain approach to the already
monstrously complex Section 341.
View
One of the principal factual considerations when dealing with
collapsibility is whether the taxpayer-stockholder has taken certain
actions "with a view to"58 acquiring capital gains rates on the in-
come from the transaction. Of course, only the individual taxpayer
really knows the answer to this question. His testimony is one
indication of whether the view, the requisite intent to receive capi-
tal gains, existed, 9 but other factors weigh heavily. One early argu-
ment advanced on the issue of view was that the word "principally"
in the definition6" modified the words "with a view to" rather than
the words "manufacture, construction, or production."61 The effect
of such an interpretation would have eased the taxpayer's burden
considerably since the term "principally" forces a quantitative dis-
tinction upon whatever it refers to. If a corporation were required
to be formed or availed of "principally" with a view to its collapsing,
then a determination would have to have been made in every case
117(m) even though most or even all of the corporation's income is eventually realizedby the corporation and taxed to it, whereas by waiting until a substantial part of
the income has been realized they could have avoided Section 117(m) and yet have
acquired a major part of the corporation's property without the income attributable
to it being taxed to the corporation. However, the statute is not directed at the
avoidance of corporate income taxes."
57 157 F. Supp. 244, 248 (N.D. Ala. 1957). "To be perfectly candid, this courtis not so naive as to suppose that a tax avoidance motive did not permeate the
organization of the corporation and did not play a part in, indeed if it did notdictate, the time and manner of the sale of the stock by its stockholders. It is toolate in the day for the defendant to insist that its citizens are obliged to conduct
their affairs and mold their businesses so as to produce for its treasury the maximum
amount in taxes."
58 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(b) (1).
59 In several cases, the taxpayers have argued that their own testimony of anintention to make a long-term investment should be sufficient to carry their burden
on the question of intent. In fact, no case has been found which accepted this theory.
See, e.g., the quotation supra note 54.
6o INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(b)(1) defines a collapsible corporation as:
... a corporation formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, construction,
or production of property, for the purchase of property which (in the hands of the
corporation) is property described in paragraph (3), or for the holding of stockin a corporation so formed or availed of, with a view to-(A) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders (whether in liquidation
or otherwise), or a distribution to its shareholders, before the realizationby the corporation manufacturing, constructing, producing, or purchasing theproperty of a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from such
property, and(B) the realization by such shareholders of gain attributable to such
property."
61 Schlesinger, The Collapsible Corporation Through the Looking Glass, 29 TAXES
895, 898 (1951).
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as to what portion of its activities were conducted with this view as
compared to its other activities. Moreover, the courts would have
had to determine what constitutes "principally," i.e., 51 per cent of
the corporation's activities, 75 per cent, or even 10 per cent, if the
other 90 per cent of the corporate activity was spread out over a
multitude of activities, none of which included more than 2 or 3
per cent of the total corporate activity. Unfortunately for subse-
quent taxpayers, one of the early cases decided the issue noting that
the argued for interpretation, ". . . is without support of any rule
of law or of grammar with which we are familiar."62
Perhaps the greatest conflict with respect to view arises over the
question of when the view must have been entertained. Under the
statute a corporation will be regarded as collapsible if the view
existed either at the time of formation or when the corporation is
later "availed of." The requisite view need not exist when the cor-
poration is formed; it is sufficient if it exists when the corporation
is availed of at some later time. 63 Of the two possibilities set forth
in the statute, i.e., "formed" or "availed of," the "availed of" alter-
native is of much greater importance. Even if the corporation is
"formed" for the purpose of collapsing, but is never actually used
for this purpose, no gain would be attributable to the shareholders,
and thus the purpose of formation would be of little importance. On
the other hand, if any corporation, whether or not formed for the
explicit purpose, is so "availed of," then, and only then, would gains
be attributable to such corporation, thus bringing it within the thrust
of Section 341.
The regulation states that the view must exist "... at any time
during the manufacture, production, construction, or purchase . .
of the collapsible property.64 Both the Second and Fourth Circuits
think that the regulations are too favorable to the taxpayer and do
not hesitate to say so. The Second Circuit has held that the view
need only exist when the corporation is availed of, despite the fact
that the regulations prescribe a narrower test which requires that
the view be availed of during construction. With respect to the test
in the regulations the court has stated: "We are disposed to disagree
with so narrow an interpretation. .. ."'I The Fourth Circuit takes a
similar position.66 It is worthwhile noting, however, that these find-
62 Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765, 768, n.2 (4th Cir. 1958); See also
Mintz v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 554, 558 (2d Cir. 1960); Weil v. Commissioner,
252 F.2d 805, 806 (2d Cir. 1958).
63 J. D. Abbott, 28 T.C. 795, aff'd, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).
64 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (3) (1955). [Emphasis added.]
65 Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1958).
66 Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958).
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ings in Burge and Glickman were not necessary to the final outcome
of the cases since there was an additional finding that the view existedduring the process of construction. Furthermore, in a later decision
by the Second Circuit, when again faced with the problem of when
the necessary view had to exist, the statement was made that,
"Whether when the view to distribute arises after completion of
construction the gain on distribution would be treated as ordinaryincome need not be decided .... ,,17 Again, the view existed during
construction, and although it again appears to be merely dictum, this
may be a slight withdrawal from the earlier strict interpretation in
Glickman.
The Third and Fifth Circuits interpret the problem much more
reasonably in favor of the taxpayer. The Third Circuit in Jacobson
v. Commissioner68 met the problem head on and stated: "The 'view'
with which a corporation is used for a particular purpose must
necessarily be a view entertained at the time of such use."
The Court continued:
To us this seems so clear on the face of the statute that we would
content ourselves with the foregoing brief analysis of the statutory text
were it not for the fact that other highly respected courts have beenpersuaded to a contrary interpretation. [Citing Glickman and Burge]
• ..However, there is an additional consideration which to us seemsdecisive in support of our reading of the statute and against the cited
cases. The interpretation which to us seems most natural and reason-
able has been adopted administratively and published in a formalTreasury regulation. [Treas. Reg. 1.341-2(a)(3).] .... Thus, the regu-lation, adopting what is certainly not an arbitrary interpretation of
the statute, treats a corporation as collapsible only if "the view to sale"
shall have existed at the time of the construction in which the corpo-
rate entity was used, or if circumstances which subsequently induce
sale were themselves within contemplation during the period of con-
struction. We are guided by and shall apply the statute as thus reason-
ably interpreted in the regulations. 69
The Tax Court opinions have oscillated between the two diver-
gent positions. Numerically, more cases have followed the
regulations7" than have declined to follow them.71 More significantis the fact that all the Tax Court cases since Jacobson was decidedin 1960, have followed that decision on this point. The trend appears
67 Mintz v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 554, 558 (2d Cir. 1960).
68 281 F.2d 703, 705 (3d Cir. 1960).
69 Id. at 705-06.
70 Estate of Louis Alper, 20 TCM 1626 (1961); Elizabeth M. August, 30 T.C.
969 (1958); Arthur Glickman, 16 TCM 532 (1957); Jesse Hartman, 34 T.C. 1085(1960); Ralph J. Solow, 22 TCM 398 (1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964);
Southwest Properties, Inc., 38 T.C. 97 (1962).
71 Rose Sidney, 30 T.C. 1155 (1958); Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. 906 (1961).
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to be definitely toward the position that the requisite view must
exist during construction. Should a subsequent case reach the oppo-
site conclusion, it would seem to be a ripe question for determination
by the Supreme Court.
Another question with respect to view that has produced con-
siderable conflict is who must have the requisite view. The regula-
tions state that ". . . those persons in a position to determine the
policies of the corporation, whether by reason of their owning a
majority of the voting stock of the corporation or otherwise, 72 are
required to have the view. It appears that a dissenting minority
shareholder, who did not have the requisite view, or even a person
who became a shareholder after the view had been entertained by
others, could be brought within the ambit of the statutory rules
through the intentions of other shareholders who did have the view.
In only one instance is the individual minority shareholder relieved
of the effect of the statute. This is the exception, previously noted,
and found in Section 341 (d)(1), which exempts the owner of five
per cent or less of the stock from the effects of the section. Note,
however, the further limitation of Section 341(d) whereby an
owner of stock is deemed to own the stock of other persons closely
related to him in business or personally, which narrows the rule
considerably.78 This is important in the collapsible corporation situa-
tion which usually involves closely held corporations. In a recent
Court of Claims case,74 and in two recent Tax Court opinions,"5 the
courts considered the question of who must have the requisite view.
In each case, minority shareholders holding more than five per cent
of the stock became disenchanted with the policies of the majority
or controlling stockholder, and sold out to the latter. Each time, the
majority stockholders continued to hold their stock, and the sale of
the stock by the minority shareholders was held not to be a collap-
sible transaction. In so holding the Court of Claims made the follow-
ing statement:
The essence of the Tax Court's rulings [in Solow and Lowery] is that
the collapsible corporation provisions are not applicable in a case in
which a minority stockholder has his stock redeemed and the majority
stockholder continues to own the corporation.76
The following criticism of this holding has been advanced: "But this
surely must be regarded as an overstatement. Obviously, it cannot
72 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (2) (1955).
78 See Butler v. Patterson, 148 F. Supp. 197 (N.D. Ala. 1957), for an example
of how one person will be deemed to be the owner of another's stock.
74 Goodwin v. United States, 320 F.2d 356 (Ct. C. 1963).
75 Ralph J. Solow, supra note 70; Sylvester J. Lowery, 39 T.C. 959, aff'd, 335
F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1964).
76 Goodwin v. United States, supra note 74, at 359.
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be assumed automatically that a less than 50 per cent shareholder is
not in control of the policies of the corporation. ' 7 However, this
much seems clear; a transaction will not be considered to be within
Section 341 when a minority shareholder, or even a 50 per cent
shareholder, who does not control the policies of the corporation (as
was the case in Solow), sells his stock to the majority or controlling
shareholder, or has his stock redeemed by the corporation while the
other shareholder keeps his stock, if the transaction is free from
obvious self-dealing between the two parties. This result would
appear to be true whether or not the transaction took place before,
during, or after the collapsible activity has been completed.
One specific area of conflict that developed involved the ques-
tion of whether Section 341 applies even if the sale of the corporate
assets would have produced capital gain had no corporation existed.
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Ivey78 held that a shareholder's
gain from sale of his stock in a collapsible corporation was not
taxable as ordinary income if such gain would have been entitled to
capital gains treatment had the taxpayer not incorporated. The case
was remanded to determine whether in fact the gain would have
qualified for capital gains treatment. In Braunstein v. Commis-
sioner7" the taxpayer argued for the position that had been accepted
by the court in the Ivey case. The Second Circuit rejected the view
taken by the Fifth Circuit despite their recognition that "this occa-
sionally produces unwarranted taxation of capital gains as ordinary
income."8 0 Because of the conflict between the circuits the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the limited question of whether Section
341 is inapplicable ". . . where the stockholders would have been
entitled to capital gains treatment had they conducted the enter-
prise in their individual capacities without utilizing a corporation."'"
The Supreme Court first determined that since neither the taxpayer
nor the corporation was engaged in the trade or business of selling
apartment houses, ". . . the corporations were not used to convert
ordinary income into capital gain and the provisions of ... [Section
341] are inapplicable."82 The Court gave a brief history of the
section and concluded:
77 29 Tax Mgmt. A-25.
78 294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1961), opinion on rehearing, 303 F.2d 109 (1962),
where the court stated: "As we see it, the statute cuts both ways. To use the statute
as a means of converting into ordinary income gain that would have been capital
gain to the individual would be at odds with the statutory purpose and incompatible
with the principles underlying the distinction between ordinary income and capital
gain."
79 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962).
80 Id. at 957.
81 371 U.S. 933 (1962).
82 Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65, 69 (1963).
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There is nothing in the language or structure of the section to demand
or even justify reading into these provisions the additional requirement
that the taxpayer must in fact have been using the corporate form as
a device to convert ordinary income into capital gain ...
For example, if we were to inquire whether or not the profit would
have been ordinary income had an enterprise been individually owned,
would we treat each taxpaying shareholder differently and look only to
his trade or business or would we consider the matter in terms of the
trade or business of any or at least a substantial number of the share-
holders? There is simply no basis in the statute for a judicial resolu-
tion of this question, and indeed when Congress addressed itself to the
problem in 1958, it approved an intricate formulation falling between
these two extremes. [Citing subsection (e).]88
The Supreme Court thus answered the problem posed by the
differences between Ivey and the Second Circuit in Braunstein. The
impact of the Braunstein decision is, of course, diminished as a
result of the enactment of subsection (e).
The existence of the requisite "view" is a factual question to
be determined by examination of all the relevant facts and circum-
stances. The regulations point out with compelling clarity that if
the sale, exchange or distribution takes place solely because of the
occurrence after construction or purchase of an event which could
not be contemplated beforehand, the corporation will not be deemed
to have been unlawfully availed of with the requisite view."4
This section of the regulations complements the previous state-
ment in the regulations that: "The requirement [that the corpora-
tion is availed of with the requisite view] is satisfied whether such
action was contemplated unconditionally, conditionally, or as a
recognized possibility.""5 When read together, the two sections
require the taxpayer to produce evidence of an uncontemplated
occurrence which precipitated the disposition of his stock at the
exact time it was disposed of in order to negate the conclusion that
the view existed. The "recognized possibility" provision in the regu-
lations has been particularly troublesome in the normal FHA case.
Often a loan is acquired in an amount which is excessive, or after
completion of the building, a reappraisal shows that it should be
revalued. The excessive funds which result from either of these two
potentialities are treated, especially where the taxpayer is a man
experienced in the building industry, 6 as either within the contem-
83 Id. at 70-72.
84 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a)(3) (1955).
85 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a)(2) (1955).
86 See the statement in Short v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 120, 122 n.3 (4th Cir.
1962), where the court notes "with more than passing interest" the fact that the
architectural firm in the instant case is the same one involved in Spangler v. Com-
missioner, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 825 (1961).
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plation of the taxpayer or as a recognized possibility during the
period of construction.
What have the courts been willing to accept as an "uncon-
templated occurrence" so as not to taint the transaction with the
undesirable view? Jacobson v. Commissioner8 7 presents virtually
the only instance where an appellate court has accepted the tax-
payer's argument that the view was formed after the uncontem-
plated occurrence. There, construction of the apartment was
completed in July of 1950. During the same month, a real estate
broker tried to induce the shareholders to sell their apartment
houses, but they rejected the offer. Later, the majority shareholder
discovered some cracks in the walls of the building and advised
the minority stockholders to sell their shares (presumably to him).
The minority group countered with an offer to purchase his shares.
Finally, both sides agreed to sell their stock. The Commissioner
determined that the corporation was collapsible and the Tax Court
agreed. The Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court stating:
The refusal of the stockholders to permit a broker to list or offer the
property for sale in July, the fact that the parties had made other
long term investments in rental property and the manifest unwilling-
ness of the majority to sell even after Winograd [the majority share-
holder] discovered the cracks and recommended sale, are all facts
found by the Tax Court. In aggregate they make a very strong and
persuasive case in support of the appellant's claim that they had no
thought of selling until after the cracks were discovered.88
Revenue Ruling 51-575 provides another instance of an un-
contemplated occurrence.89 A corporation completed construction
of a housing project under the Wherry Act.9 ° Later, the Housing
Act of 195691 was passed which required the project to be sold to
the proper military authority. The sale of the property, solely
because of the enactment of the latter Act, was an uncontemplated
occurrence and thus not a collapsible transaction.
In Braunstein v. Commissioner,92 petitioner claimed that sale
of the property was due to unanticipated circumstances which
caused a decrease in rents and an increase in operating expenses.
The Second Circuit found that: (a) real estate taxes on the property
had increased; (b) discontinuance of free rubbish removal by the
city cost taxpayers $8,500; (c) to meet competition, the corpora-
87 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960).
88 Id. at 707.
89 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 236.
90 63 Stat. 570 (1949), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1748-48i (1958).
91 70 Stat. 1110 (1956), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1594 (1958).
92 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962).
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tions were required to furnish free gas and electricity; and (d) there
was an increase in vacancy rates. Although some of these expenses
were admittedly unexpected, the Second Circuit found, on balance,
that the annual surplus of one apartment project was only $1,010
dollars less than projected, the other only $5,100 less. The court
stated that, "It is difficult to believe that this small decrease, which
is all the taxpayers had cause to expect, would have caused experi-
enced real estate operators like the three taxpayers to sell their
stock unless they had a previous view to its sale."'93
Despite the court's conclusion, a strong argument can still be
made that, under proper circumstances, such factors as increased
real estate tax, added expenses for rubbish removal, gas, or elec-
tricity, price competition, higher vacancy rates than had been ex-
pected and other similar expenses, are facts which may negate the
conclusion that the view existed before the completion of
construction.
The health of one of the parties to the sale has often been a
controlling factor. In Elliott v. United States,94 one of the minority
shareholders suffered two strokes and was advised to retire from
active participation in the project. He convinced another minority
shareholder to sell also, and finally, they both convinced the
majority shareholder to give in. Nine months after construction was
completed, the sale was consummated. The court held that the
requisite view did not exist.95
Other examples of uncontemplated occurrences have been
upheld. In Wheeler Kelly & Hagny Invest. Co. v. United States,9"
the gain was attributable to a general appreciation in market value.
Similarly, in Morris Cohen97 a factual situation was presented
where:
There is evidence here that the early sale at a profit of the DOM stock
was made possible by the selection of nearby land for the location of
two large manufacturing plants, a fortunate circumstance not antici-
pated by the petitioners. 98
Southwest Properties, Inc.,9" involved the increase in value of land
in question because of the decision of a bank to open near the cite
98 Id. at 955.
94 205 F. Supp. 384 (D. Ore. 1962).
95 For additional cases where health has been a significant factor see, e.g., Charles
J. Riley, 35 T.C. 848 (1961); Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. 906 (1961); Shilowitz v.
United States, 221 F. Supp. 179 (D.N.J. 1963).
96 64-1 USTC 11 9260 (1964).
97 39 T.C. 886 (1963).
98 Id. at 892.
99 38 T.C. 97 (1962).
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owned by the taxpayers. In Jack Saltzman,'00 the petitioner used the
cash which he received from the sale of his property to further
invest in his electrical business which he had purchased over a year
after the purchase of his office building. In each of the above-
mentioned cases, the events were found not to have been anticipated
by the taxpayers, thus not tainting their actions with the view
necessary to make Section 341 applicable.
It will be recalled that the statute requires that the property be
constructed, ". . . with a view to-
(A) the sale or exchange of stock ... and,
(B) the realization by such shareholders of gain attributable
to such property.' 01
Both views are necessary in order that the statutory requirement
be met. Payne v. Commissioner °2 is the only reported instance
where the taxpayer attempted to separate the two views which are
required under Section 341. The taxpayer in Payne was not suc-
cessful in his attempt to separate the two views. The failure empha-
sizes once again that if a view to the sale or exchange of the stock
is found, and if in fact a gain does accrue to the stockholder, then
aside from very unusual extenuating circumstances, the view to the
realization of the gain attributable to the property will be imputed.
There seems to be little hope that the separate view distinction may
be argued with success in the future.0 3
CONSTRUCTION
The collapsible corporation is one which is "availed of princi-
pally for the manufacture, construction, or production of property
.... ,,) Most of the cases arising under Section 341 are concerned
with real estate corporations which have been engaged, directly or
indirectly, in the construction of buildings. The question of whether
construction is in process at certain stages of the transaction is
important in three contexts:
1. If construction has not begun, Section 341 does not apply.'0 5
2. If construction has not been completed at the time of the
sale, distribution or exchange, the corporation may be regarded as
100 22 TCM 336 (1963).
101 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(b)(1).
102 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959).
103 Tax Mgmt. 29, A-26.
104 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(b) (1).
105 Morris Cohen, 39 T.C. 886 (1963).
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collapsible. The regulations, °6 and several of the cases applying
them, concede that if the requisite view arises after construction is
completed, the collapsible provisions of Section 341 will not attach.
3. If Section 341(d) is to apply, three years must have passed
after construction is completed.
It is thus necessary to know when construction has begun as
well as when it has been completed. In all three situations the term
"construction" has been broadly construed both by the Internal
Revenue Service and the courts.
Activities prior to sale or exchange which have been held to
constitute construction include:
1. Successfully petitioning to a zoning board to have land
owned by a corporation re-zoned from a residential to a commercial
class.10
7
2. Engaging an architect to revise boundary lines on a plat,
paying for a building permit, making a deposit for the purchase of
water materials, advancing money to the utility company to make
connections, and making payments to acquire FHA loans.'
08 The
Second Circuit felt that it did not have to rely wholly on the filing
of applications for permits, loans and the payment of filing fees in
order to hold that "construction to any extent" had started since
the corporation had also paid for water materials and utility con-
nections. In dictum the court declared that it was not saying that
the filing alone would not have been enough since real estate develop-
ment is so heavily dependent upon government licenses and loans.
The court then concluded that the word "construction" had to be
interpreted broadly since the legislative history showed an equation
of "construction" with "adding value to the property.'
0 9
3. Subdividing the corporate property, making provisions for
sewers, streets and utilities and arranging for FHA financing of the
project. The taxpayers, who had acted on behalf of the corporation,
argued in Abbott v. Commissioner,"' that the statute required the
construction to be done by the corporation, whereas in this case
much of the construction enhancing the value of the land had been
done after the liquidation of the corporation. In finding that con-
106 Treas. Reg. 1.341-2 (a) (3) (1955). "A corporation is formed or availed of with
a view to the action described in Section 341(b) if the requisite view existed at any
time during the manufacture, production, construction, or purchase referred to in
that section." [Emphasis added.]
107 Rev. Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 178.
108 Farber v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1963).
109 Id. at 734.
110 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).
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struction had begun, the court stated that the entire operation was
arranged for and covered by binding agreements that only the cor-
poration was in a position to carry forward at the time these agree-
ments were entered into. The court then stated: ". . . [I]f
individuals could thus project the acts which would take place after
distribution and dissolution as though the corporation was in no
sense a participant, a11 of the provisions in question would be
meaningless.""'
4. Subdividing land, having the land annexed to a city, and
obtaining an FHA commitment, all of which was done by indi-
viduals, was held, in Payne"2 to be as much an integral part of
construction as is the erection of a building.
5. Contracting to buy land, seeking an FHA mortgage com-
mitment through a mortgage broker, and employing an architect
who had completed about 40 per cent of the total plans. These
activities of a corporation formed to erect and own apartment
houses were sufficient to sustain a finding that it had engaged in
construction." 8
6. Applying for and receiving a zoning change, hiring an archi-
tect to draw preliminary plans, negotiating with a city for buildingpermits and acquiring two tenants were held to be construction in
Sproul Realty Co." 4
On the other hand, several recent opinions have held that a
certain amount of preliminary activity on the part of a corporation
would not constitute "construction." In Morris Cohen"5 the cor-poration had attempted to have water service supplied to the land,
employed a surveyor to make a contour map showing how theproperty could be developed as commercial land, and filed a petition
to have the property rezoned as residential instead of agricultural.
During this period two large manufacturing plants were built near
the corporation's land, and an unsolicited offer was made to buy
either the corporation's stock or its land. The offer was accepted.In finding that there was no construction under Section 341(b),
Judge Murdock, speaking for the Tax Court, held:
The very limited activities of representatives of Sarkisian or of DOM
while the petitioners owned its stock did not put either in the real
II Id. at 541.112 30 T.C. 1044, aff'd, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959).115 Sterner, 32 T.C. 1144 (1959). See also the Tax Court decision in Abbott, 28T.C. 795, 805, aff'd, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958), where the statement was made:
"Indeed, it may be said that construction, of a road is no less 'construction' than
building an apartment house."
114 38 T.C. 844 (1962).
115 39 T.C. 886 (1963).
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estate business, did not result in any physical danger or improvement
to the property of either and, in the case of DOM, did not constitute
"construction" even within the broad meaning of that term as used
in Section 341(b).116
Cohen and Vernon M. McPherson,"7 the most recent cases to deal
with the problem of preliminary activities and construction, can be
reconciled with the earlier cases solely on the basis that they, unlike
the earlier cases, did not involve FHA loans."
8
An even more liberal interpretation of "construction" has been
applied to determine the point of completion. If anything remains
to be done the courts will find that "construction" has not been
completed. The extreme, thus far, is Glickman v. Commissioner,"9
where the buildings in question were entirely finished when the
sale was made, but some minor landscaping and a final FHA inspec-
tion remained. The FHA had, however, made preliminary inspec-
tions and had permitted occupancy as the individual buildings were
completed. In addition, the municipal authorities had issued their
final certificate of occupancy. The cash distribution was made on
January 13 and four days later the final FHA inspection was made.
The Second Circuit, in holding that "construction" had not been
completed, stretched the term almost to the breaking point by
saying, ". . . [T]hat under the correct interpretation of the statute
'construction' should be defined technically to mean all construction
required to perform the contract completely."' 20
In Edward Weil,' 21 a retaining wall and a parking lot remained
to be constructed. In setting the outer limit of the word "construc-
tion," the court said, "the final completion could not be fixed earlier
than the time when the project was ready to begin earning a 'sub-
stantial part' of the 'net income' .... 122 The Weil test is easier for
the taxpayer to meet than the Glickman test since, in Glickman, the
116 Id. at 892.
117 21 TCM 583 (1962), involving employment of a land planning consultant and
engineering firm.
118 Tax. Mgmt. No. 29, A-I1 notes that: "FHA corporations . . . present a
classic example of what the collapsible corporation provisions were intended to fore-
stall. . . . [lt is not so clear from the facts [of Cohen and McPherson] that the
purpose of the collapsible corporation provisions would be frustrated if the taxpayer
in those cases were permitted to realize capital gains. Thus, in the earlier cases the
court was probably more disposed to extend the ordinary meaning of construction
than it was in the later two decisions." Cf., the similar argument made and rejected
in Braunstein v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 949, 957 (2d Ci. 1962).
119 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958). Cf., Epstein v. United States, 221 F. Supp.
479 (N.D. Ohio 1963), where the point was assumed for discussion but the decision
was grounded on another issue.
120 256 F.2d at 111.
121 28 T.C. 809 (1957).
122 Id. at 816.
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corporation could have begun, and as a matter of fact had begun, to
earn a substantial part of its net income, but technically, had not
completely performed the contract. A good example of how the
Weil test can work to the taxpayer's advantage is Maxwell Tern-
kin,121 where repairs to walks, driveways, steps and a considerable
amount of landscaping remained to be completed to fulfill the con-
tract. These facts did not prevent the Tax Court from finding the
construction had been completed, since the building had been occu-
pied and producing rents for some time. Temkin and Weil, unlike
Glickman, did not involve corporations using FHA financing and are,
therefore, analogous to Cohen and McPherson, which were con-
cerned with the beginning of construction. A recent revenue
ruling'24 dealt with facts similar to those in Glickman. Following
completion of construction as set forth in the plans and specifica-
tions, minor alterations and corrections (including a change of
decor, removal of an obstruction and installation of rest rooms)
were made. The alterations did not increase rental area, change the
character of the structure or increase the fair market value or
realizable net income of the building. This was not considered to be
"construction." There is no indication whether an FHA commitment
was involved. The ruling may be an indication that the InternalRevenue Service is retreating from its absolute position.
The final chapter on the judicial definition of "construction"
has not yet been written. As to commencement and conclusion, there
remains a sharp split of authority. Perhaps this dichotomy will be
rationalized on the basis of the presence or absence of FHA guar-
antees. This rationale is, of course, a pure fiction. No good reason
can be advanced to support the proposition that different rules
should apply to two corporations with identical work remaining,
merely because one has obtained an FHA loan and the other has
used conventional bank financing. Such a result is, obviously, a
throwback to the philosophy of strict interpretation and congres-
sional intent and an undue reliance on the fact of "view." The better
rule of Weil and Temkin should be followed whether or not there
was an FHA commitment.
SUBSTANTIAL PART
The Circuits are clearly split as to the interpretation of the
words "a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from
such property." " ' Section 341(b) (1), from which these words are
drawn, declares that the collapsible provisions will apply When the
123 35 T.C. 886 (1963).
124 Rev. Rul. 63-114, 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 74.
125 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(b) (1) (A).
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sale or exchange is made before a substantial part of the corpora-
tion's net income has been earned. A major problem has arisen
because of the courts' inability to agree on the time when these
words should apply. The Fifth Circuit 126 has declared that "sub-
stantial part" refers to the income which the corporation has
realized up to the time of the sale or exchange. Under this theory,
if at the time of the sale or exchange the corporation has realized a
"substantial part" of the net income to be realized, the corporation
will not be collapsible within the meaning of Section 341. The Third
Circuit, 2 7 on the other hand, has stated that "substantial part"
means that the corporation cannot have a "substantial part" of its
income yet to be realized at the time of the sale or exchange. A
related problem is: What constitutes a "substantial part" since this
term is not defined by the Code or Regulations?
A starting point is provided by the relatively early case of
Levenson v. United States12 wherein the court noted that Congress
had given no indication of what per cent of income would be "sub-
stantial," and expressed its belief that the phrase would cause
interpretive difficulty. The court said that, absent any amendment
to the statute, determination would be made on an ad hoc basis "by
the courts and local tax officials.' 29
Whether pre-sale or post-sale income was to be used to deter-
mine if the substantial-part test has been met, was first considered
in Abbott. 30 The Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, believing
that the lower court had followed the post-sale rule, and stated:
The real question posed by the statute, however, is not whether a
substantial part of the total profit was realized prior to dissolution,
but rather whether that part of the total profit realized after dissolu-
tion was substantial. This was the test correctly applied by the Tax
Court in making its finding that the dissolution took place before a
substantial part (nearly 90%) of the total profit was realized.'
3
'
However, James B. Kelley 32 (the next Tax Court case) indi-
cated that the Third Circuit had misinterpreted the Tax Court's
application of the substantial part test. In a sharply divided opinion
(five judges dissented, including the judge who wrote Abbott), the
Tax Court stated that it had not meant to follow the post-sale test,
and did not believe that it had done so. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
126 Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
127 Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).
128 157 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
129 Id. at 250.
130 28 T.C. 795, aff'd, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).
131 Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1958).
132 32 T.C. 135 (1960).
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affirmed' 83 in a very comprehensive opinion. The court noted that
the opinion of the Third Circuit in Abbott was a surprise to the Tax
Court; it cited the lower court's opinion in Kelley, and took note of
the position of the Commissioner and the taxpayer. The court
stated, "The grit in the oil is that a substantial part has already been
realized, but a substantial part remains to be realized, leaving plenty
of life in the collapsible corporation device."' 8 4 Then, deciding in
favor of the taxpayer, the opinion continued, "Section 117(m)
requires only that 'a substantial part' be realized. The indefinite
article 'a' says in plain language that there may be two or more
substantial parts."' 85
Kelley provides the better reasoned rule, since it interprets the
statutory language clearly and precisely. Nevertheless, the split
between the Circuits remains and is emphasized by the fact that the
Internal Revenue Service has served notice that it will not follow
Kelley"' as well as by the fact that even the Kelley decisions were
not unanimous. However, the present judicial trend clearly followsthe Kelley doctrine. 187
On the issue of what actually is a substantial part of the taxable
income to be derived from the property, there has been a wide diver-
gence of opinion among the courts. Some have held 50 per cent, 138
40 per c~nt,189 33 per cent,140 and 34 per cent' 4' constituted a sub-
stantial part. On the other hand, 17 per cent,142 10 per cent,'148 and
9Y2 per cent'" have been held not to be a substantial part. It should
be kept in mind that the "substantial part" in issue is a substantial
part of the taxable rather than net income.14' And it also should be
emphasized that the particular facts of the case are important. Thus,
the Fifth Circuit has found one-third to be a substantial part and
138 Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
134 Id. at 909.
135 Id. at 912.
136 Rev. Rul. 62-12, 1962-1 Cum. BuLL. 321. In this regard, cf. Treas. Reg. §
1.341-5(c) (2) (1955).187 Commissioner v. Zongker, 334 F.2d 44, 45-46 (10th Cir. 1964), refers to
the Kelley decision as, "an exhaustive and penetrating treatment . . ." of the statutory
meaning which is, "more plausible and certainly less penal." The court in Winn v.United States, 243 F. Supp. 282, 290 (W.D. Mo. 1965) stated, "The opinion of JudgeWisdom appears to be unassailable unless one ignores the plain language of the
statute .... "
188 Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ala. 1957).189 Winn v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 282 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
140 Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (Sth Cir. 1961).
141 E. J. Zongker, 39 T.C. 1046 (1963).142 Heft v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1961).
143 Abbott, 28 T.C. 795, aff'd, 158 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).
144 Maxwell Tobias, 40 T.C. 84 (1963). The Commissioner acquiesced in 1964-1
Cum. BuLL. 5.
145 Arthur Pomponio, 33 T.C. 1072 (1960).
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seventeen per cent to be insubstantial. In holding that thirty-four
per cent was substantial, the Tax Court found no cases indicating
that more than twenty per cent was insubstantial. Below twenty
per cent will probably be held insubstantial; above thirty per cent
will probably be held substantial. A case involving something
between these two figures will be decided on the facts presented.
Since no hard and fast rule can be established without legislative
direction, in the exceptional case even the 20-30 per cent rule may
not stand up. Prior to Kelley, the Intern al Revenue Service followed
a rule of thumb that over fifty per cent would be considered sub-
stantial.'46 In view of the fact that the Service declines to follow
Kelley, it can be expected to require at least fifty per cent in the
future.
PRESENT AVAILABILITY OF SECTION 341
Although several courts and the Internal Revenue Service have
taken an overly stringent view of Section 341, there is, as Judge
Wisdom has sagely noted, "plenty of life in the collapsible corpora-
tion device.' x47 Regarding the present availability of Section 341,
the following factors must be carefully considered:
1. Negation of the Requisite View. This can best be achieved
by showing that prior to the time the corporation was "availed
of,"'1 4 8 there was an absence of factors which would indicate that the
taxpayer intended to utilize this corporation for tax avoidance pur-
poses. For example, one might show; (1) other investments for long-
term capital gains in this type of property, 149 (2) absence of two
classes of stock "so that one class could be redeemed as soon as
the building was completed,"' 50 (3) no FHA mortgage guaranty
during construction. On the other hand, an uncontemplated occur-
rence after construction has been completed (decrease of rental
income, increase of expenses, health reasons, increased valuation of
the land because of activities of other landholders nearby) can also
show a lack of the necessary view.
2. Construction. If the sale or exchange is early in the series
of transactions, an argument should be made that construction has
not begun, especially if the corporation has not relied upon an
FHA guaranty.' It also can be argued, on the basis of Maxwell
146 3B MERTENS, LAW Or FEDERAL INcoME TAXATiON C. 22 p. 256 (1958).
147 Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904, 909 (5th Cir. 1961).
148 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(b)(1).
149 See however, the distinction between "investor shareholder," "dealer share-
holder," and "hypothetical dealer" in Tax Mgmt. No. 49, at A-9.
150 Elliott v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 384, 387 (D. Ore. 1962).
151 Morris Cohen, 39 T.C. 866 (1963); Vernon M. McPherson, 21 T.C.M. 583
(1962).
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Temkin,'52 that Section 341 does not apply because the "view" did
not exist until after the completion of construction.
3. Substantial Part. The better-reasoned rule of Commissioner
v. Kelley 5' should be followed in regard to when the corporation
must earn a substantial part of its taxable income. If the Kelley
rule is followed by the courts, a minimum of thirty per cent of theincome will have to be earned by the corporation before the sale
or exchange. Whereas, if the Abbott rule is followed, 154 fifty per
cent would seem to be necessary.
4. Section 341(d) Limitations. These exceptions become im-portant only if the corporation is found to be collapsible.
a. Seventy per cent rule. If less than seventy per cent of the
gain is attributable to the collapsible property of the cor-
poration, Section 341 is inapplicable. If a corporation which
owns a building is later availed of to construct a second
building, and the gain can be equally divided between the
two buildings, the seventy per cent exception will absolve
the taxpayer from any liability. This may be one of the
most important means of escaping the burden of Section
341.155
b. Three year rule. If the corporation holds the property for
three years following construction, before the shareholder
sells or exchanges his stock, Section 341 does not apply.
Care must be taken to see that construction is completed.'56
c. Five per cent rule. A taxpayer who owns less than five per
cent of the outstanding shares in a corporation is relieved
from liability although the corporation is collapsible.' 57
5. Section 341(e). In general, subsection (e) provides for an
exemption from the collapsible provisions of Section 341 if the net
unrealized appreciation of the corporation's subsection (e) assetsdoes not exceed fifteen per cent of the corporation's net worth at
the time of: (a) a sale or exchange of stock under Section 341 (a) (1),(b) a complete liquidation under Section 341(a)(2), (c) a Section
152 35 T.C. 906 (1961).
153 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
154 Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).155 Moses, The 70 Per Cent Rule-A Possible Haven for Taxpayers Faced With
Collapsible Corporation Problems, 51 A.B.A.J. 188 (1965); Chodrow & Castro, Howto Use .the "70-30" Exception to Avoid Collapsible Corporation Treatment, 21 J.
TAXATION 258 (1964).
156 See, e.g., Rev. Rule 56-137, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 178.
157 Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244, 251 (N.D. Ala. 1957). InLevenson the 10% rule of § 117(m) (3) (A) was applied. The per cent requirement
was changed by the 1954 amendment to 5% and is now found in § 341(d) (1).
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333 partial liquidation, (d) a Section 337 dissolution. If it is sus-
pected that the provisions of subsection (e) may be applicable to
a particular fact situation, care should be taken to investigate this
extremely complex subsection. The authorities listed above will
undoubtedly prove extremely useful.
6. Section 333. If a corporation is found to be collapsible, but
is able to take advantage of one of the exceptions in Section 341 (d)
or 341(e), then it is not a corporation to which Section 341(a)
applies, and may qualify under Section 333. This section specifically
states that it applies to complete liquidations other than a collapsi-
ble corporation to which Section 341 (a) applies.
58
7. Six-Month Rule. If the sale or exchange is within six
months from the time it was acquired, none of the collapsible corpo-
ration provisions will attach, inasmuch as Section 341 applies only
to gains which would otherwise be long term capital gains.' 59
8. Election. A timely election of Subchapter S160 is a possible
solution to the collapsible problem, if the collapsible property of
the corporation is not inventory.' 6'
9. Section 337. Under certain conditions, a taxpayer might be
able to take advantage of Section 337.1"2
10. Section 341(f) Exception. These provisions remove from
the operation of Section 341, sales of stock during a six-month
period after the corporation has consented to a recognition by it of
future gain on its subsection (f) assets. The subsection (f) provi-
sions are expected to provide assistance in cases of stock sales in
a corporation which is "rapidly growing and expects to continue
in business but which holds constructed or produced properties
which are worth substantially more than their cost and upon which
there has not been substantial realization of the profits to be derived
from the properties."'
63
CONCLUSION
The foregoing shows that the collapsible corporation, while
considerably limited in scope by statute, judicial decision, and the
Internal Revenue Service, from what it once was, has by no means
158 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 333(a).
159 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341(a). See also BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 302 (1959).
160 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371-77.
161 Axelrad, Collapsible Corporations and Collapsible Partnerships, 1960 So.
CALIF. TAX INST. 269, 365 (1960).
162 29 Tax Mgmt. A-51.
163 H.R. Rep. No. 1308, in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
3081, 3082 (1964).
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become a useless concept. In an attempt to plug the collapsible
corporation loophole, Congress has succeeded only in constructing
a confusing statutory framework which fails to do the job. Thishas resulted in a series of confusing and conflicting decisions by
the courts. As Judge Wisdom has noted, "The effect of our holding
is to leave the loophole two-thirds open . . . . If Congress wants a
better job done, Congress should provide a tax that will not just
plug the loophole 'a substantial part of the way.' ""' If this is to be
the case, the business-planning attorney has a duty to his client to
utilize the loophole left open by the statute, for, as Judge Lynne
noted, "It is too late in the day for the ... [United States] to insist
that its citizens are obliged to conduct their affairs and mold their
businesses so as to produce for its treasury the maximum amount in
taxes."'05 The device of the collapsible corporation, when employed
wisely and with the necessary safeguards, can be an effective tool
in the hands of the skilled business-planning attorney.
164 Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904, 913 (5th Cir. 1961).165 Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244, 248 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
